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By many accounts cooperation appears to be a default strategy in social interaction. There are, 
however, several documented instances in which reflexive responding favors aggressive 
behaviors: for example, interactions with out-group members. We conduct a rigorous test of 
potential boundary conditions of intuitive prosociality by looking at whether intuition favors 
cooperation even towards competitive out-group members, and even in losses frames. Moreover, 
we address three major methodological limitations of previous research in this area: a lack of an 
unconstrained control condition; non-compliance with time manipulations leading to high rates 
of exclusions and thus a selection bias; and non-comprehension of the structure of the game. Even 
after eliminating participant selection bias and non-comprehension, we find that deliberation 
decreases cooperation: even in competitive contexts towards out-groups and even in a losses 
frame, though the differences in cooperation between groups was consistent across conditions. 
People may be intuitive cooperators, but they are not intuitively impartial. 
 
 
A recent body of research suggests that, far 
from requiring effortful control, behaving 
prosocially arises from “processes that are 
intuitive, reflexive, and even automatic” 
(Zaki & Mitchell, 2013, p. 466). Several 
studies find that people tend to make 
prosocial decisions in economic games 
more quickly than selfish ones, and time-
pressure increases the incidence of 
prosocial behavior (for an overview and 
meta-analysis see Rand, 2016). Time delay 
reduces helping in a ‘dropped-glove’ field 
study (Artavia-Mora, Bedi, & Rieger, 2017) 
and even risking one’s own life to save 
another seems driven primarily by 
intuitive processes (Rand & Epstein, 2014). 
To explain this, the Social Heuristics 
Hypothesis (SHH: Rand, 2016; Rand et al., 
2014) posits that the social strategies 
typically successful in daily life (e.g., 
cooperation) become automatized as 
default responses, and that deliberation 
can override these defaults to modify 
behavior. Indeed, a formal analysis of 
evolutionary dynamics indicates that 
deliberation can only serve to undermine 
costly cooperation and not promote it 
(Bear, Kagan, & Rand, 2017; Bear & Rand, 
2016). While meta-analytic work has 
provided strong support for the claim that 
manipulating reliance on intuition through 
time pressure encourages prosociality 
(Rand, 2016; Rand et al., 2014), a recent 
Registered Replication Report (RRR) by 
Bouwmeester and colleagues (2017) finds 
only mixed support. Our aim is to consider 
two challenges to the idea that intuition 
favors cooperation—one methodological 
and one theoretical—and then to provide 
new experimental evidence.  
 
Boundary conditions on intuitive cooperation: 
Intergroup bias and decision framing 
 
One of the most enduring findings in 
social psychology is intergroup bias: the 
powerful tendency to evaluate and treat in-
group members more favorably than out-
group members (Hewstone, Rubin, & 
Willis, 2002). How does intuitive 
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cooperation play out in intergroup 
contexts? The SSH posits that cooperative 
strategies that are typically advantageous 
in daily life with repeated trustworthy 
interaction partners become internalized 
as intuitions and get overgeneralized to 
less typical settings. Given this, we might 
reason that social heuristics, precisely 
because they are overgeneralized, will 
apply even to out-group members and it is 
deliberation that ‘corrects’ this process and 
causes increased intergroup bias. 
Supporting this, for example, is an 
experiment employing a Public Goods 
Game with minimal groups; conceptual 
priming of intuition leads to equivalent 
contributions to both in-group and out-
group members, whereas priming 
reflection leads to pronounced in-group 
favoritism (Ma, Liu, Rand, Heatherton, & 
Han, 2015). 
 Yet the idea that intuition uniformly 
favors cooperation even with out-group 
members is at odds with much past 
evidence suggesting that the preference for 
‘us’ over ‘them’ is at least partially rooted in 
implicit, unconscious, or automatic 
processes. Preference for in-group 
members appears early in development 
(Dunham, Baron, & Banaji, 2008), and 
group memberships appear to generate 
bias at the earliest stages of perceptual and 
emotional processes (for a review see 
Cikara & Van Bavel, 2014). Intergroup bias 
often occurs outside the realm of conscious 
awareness and, for this reason, can be 
remarkably difficult to control or change 
permanently (Greenwald, McGhee, & 
Schwartz, 1998). For example, a recent test 
of 9 interventions that reduce implicit 
prejudice in the IAT found that none lasted 
more than one day (Lai et al., 2016). There 
is also evidence for intuitive aggression 
towards out-groups - for example, in the 
Shooter task where participants are 
required to “shoot” armed targets and to 
“not shoot” unarmed targets (Correll, Park, 
Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2002). Participants 
under time pressure are more likely to 
mistakenly shoot other-race targets than 
same-race targets (Correll et al., 2002) and 
are more likely to mistakenly shoot 
minimal out-group members than in-group 
members (Miller, Zielaskowski, & Plant, 
2012).  
Looking specifically at prosocial 
behaviour, several convergent findings 
indicate that intuition encourages in-group 
favoritism rather than impartial 
cooperation. Experiments using the 
Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma–
Maximizing Differences Game (Halevy, 
Bornstein, & Sagiv, 2008) find that 
parochial altruism - contributions to a pool 
that both benefits the in-group and 
simultaneously hurts the out-group - 
emerges especially among individuals who 
were cognitively taxed by completing a 
Stroop interference task (Dreu, Dussel, & 
Velden, 2015). Another series of 
experiments using a Prisoner’s Dilemma 
with real political groups (Obama vs. 
Romney supporters) and a time pressure 
manipulation demonstrate that intuition 
increases cooperation to both in-group and 
out-group members, but that the 
difference between groups is maintained 
relative to an enforced time delay 
condition (Rand, Newman, & Wurzbacher, 
2015). Therefore, while at least one study 
indicates that intuition reduces in-group 
favoritism (Ma et al., 2015), two others 
indicate that intuition increases in-group 
favoritism (De Dreu et al., 2015; Ten 
Velden, Daughters, & De Dreu, 2017), and a 
fourth study indicates that intuition 
increases prosocial behavior but neither 
increases nor decreases in-group 
favoritism (Rand et al., 2015).  
One possibility for this inconsistency is 
that existing studies using time pressure 
have typically contrasted a manipulation 
intended to promote intuition against a 
manipulation intended to promote 
reflection, but do not assess these 
manipulations against an unconstrained 
control condition (e.g. Capraro, Jordan, & 
Rand, 2014; Cone & Rand, 2014; Rand et al., 
2014; Verkoeijen & Bouwmeester, 2014). 
Such a design cannot distinguish evidence 
that time pressure increases cooperation 
from evidence that time constraint reduces 
cooperation; as such, discrepancies across 
the intergroup studies might reflect the 
relative efficacy of the intuitive versus 
deliberative manipulations included in 
each.  
Our second theoretical contribution is 
to explore the consequences of framing a 
social dilemma in terms of losses versus 
gains.  Motivated in part by prior research 
on active hostility in intergroup contexts 
(e.g. Correll et al., 2002; Sherif, 1966), we 
speculated that defection against out-
Forthcoming: Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 
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group members might be the intuitive 
response especially in a social dilemma 
framed in terms of losses (i.e., defection 
imposes a cost) rather than gains (i.e., 
defection withholds a benefit). Prior 
research on framing in social dilemmas is 
inconsistent, and has varyingly shown loss 
frames to increase cooperation (e.g. 
Experiment 3 in Komorita & Carnevale, 
1992), reduce cooperation (e.g. Brewer & 
Kramer, 1986), or have no effect (e.g. de 
Heus, Hoogervorst, & Dijk, 2010). This may 
occur because decision frames have 
divergent effects based on an individual’s 
prior motives, such that prosocial people 
become more cooperative, and 
‘individualists’ less cooperative (De Dreu & 
McCusker, 1997). Because people’s prior 
motives are different with regards to in-
group and out-group members, we might 
therefore expect loss frames to encourage 
defection towards out-groups (because 
without a prior motive to be cooperative, 
loss frames make people more selfish) and 
cooperation towards in-groups (because 
loss frames enhance the existing motive to 
help the in-group member).  
 
Methodological Challenges for Intuitive Cooperation 
 
 In addition to these theoretical 
concerns, recent research has challenged 
intuitive cooperation findings on 
methodological grounds (Tinghög et al., 
2013). This critique focuses especially on 
the use of time pressure versus time delay 
to manipulate the balance of automatic 
versus controlled inputs into cooperation 
decisions, specifically citing high levels of 
participant exclusions and selection bias 
(Bouwmeester et al., 2017; Tinghög et al., 
2013). The original studies excluded 
participants who failed to make their 
decisions within the response window. 
These exclusion rates are typically very 
high and, more importantly, asymmetric 
across conditions. For example, in Rand, 
Greene, and Nowak (2012), 48% of 
participants failed to make their decisions 
under time pressure in Study 6, and 46% 
failed in Study 7 relative to 19% and 10% in 
the time delay conditions, respectively. 
While by some accounts these effects hold 
when including non-compliant 
participants (Rand et al., 2014; Rand, 
Greene, & Nowak, 2013), these exclusion 
practices introduce the possibility of 
selection bias. Eliminating participants 
who are too slow from the time pressure 
condition and not from the time delay 
condition disrupts random assignment to 
condition. Therefore, the observed 
difference in cooperation could be driven 
by systematic differences between the 
participants rather than the manipulation. 
For example, Tinghög et al. (2013) could 
not successfully replicate Rand et al.’s 
(2012) results without exclusions and 
therefore conclude the original findings 
were “an artefact of excluding the about 
50% of subjects who failed to respond on 
time” (p.427). Consistent with this 
possibility, a recent pre-registered multi-
site replication study (Bouwmeester et al., 
2017) reported that two-thirds of 
participants failed to make decisions 
within the allotted time and that the effect 
of time pressure on cooperation was only 
present when excluding such individuals. 
Of course, this data is also consistent with 
the possibility that individuals who fail to 
conform to the time-pressure treatment 
therefore show no effect of that treatment. 
A similar problem arises with the use of 
comprehension checks, where large 
numbers of participants fail to correctly 
answer comprehension questions about 
the structure of the game after they have 
played it. Across the studies reported by 
Rand et al. (2012), comprehension checks 
were implemented after the game had been 
played to avoid suggesting a deliberative 
mindset to participants prior to decision 
making. And indeed, as Rand and 
colleagues report in a supplementary 
study, participants who complete 
comprehension questions before making 
their decision choose to contribute 
significantly less than those who complete 
the comprehension questions afterward 
(Rand et al., 2012). However, in practice 
this means that participants may play the 
game while not understanding it. For 
example, 32% of participants in Study 1 of 
Rand et al. (2015) failed one or both 
comprehension checks and yet were 
included in the final analysis. While the 
effects of time pressure were robust to 
controlling for comprehension, this 
remains a potentially problematic aspect of 
the dominant methodological design. 
 Given these concerns (and the lack 
of the control condition raised in the 
previous section), we designed a procedure 
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that accomplishes three key 
methodological goals.  First, we drastically 
reduced exclusion rates due to the 
response window, achieving an exclusion 
rate of just 2% of participants enrolled in 
the study. We accomplished this by 
providing participants with extensive 
comprehension training prior to the task 
employing alternative payoff matrices.  
This prepared them to quickly absorb and 
respond to information presented briefly 
in the main task. Second, we equated the 
exclusion procedure across the time 
pressure and time delay conditions. We 
accomplished this by subjecting 
participants in the time delay condition to 
an additional, subsequent time-pressure 
trial, and then excluding their data if they 
failed to meet the response deadline on this 
subsequent trial. Thus, our exclusion rates 
were both very low and comparable across 
conditions. Finally, we included an 
unconstrained control condition to test 
whether time delay, time pressure, or both 
are significantly different from 






Our design, hypotheses, and analysis 
plan were all pre-registered at the Open 
Science Framework 
(https://osf.io/v82gc/). We report all 
measures, manipulations, and exclusions 
in this study. All data, analysis code, and 
experiment materials are available for 




1316 American participants completed 
the experiment online using Amazon 
Mechanical Turk and received $0.70 for 
their time, with all participants being paid 
the same additional bonus of $0.70 (the 
maximum achievable in the task). In 
accordance with the pre-registration we 
planned, participants were excluded if 
they completed the survey more than once 
(N = 158); failed simple comprehension 
checks regarding which group they had 
been assigned to (N = 0); and/or failed to 
the complete the main PD trial in the time 
pressure condition (N = 9) or failed to 
complete the time pressure bonus round in 
the time delay condition (N = 9). Therefore, 
the final sample consisted of 1140 
participants (557 female). For these main 
effects we had around 380 participants per 
condition for the three time-instruction 
conditions, and 570 per condition for the 
gains/loss and in-group/out-group 
conditions.   
In order to assess our statistical power 
to detect the elimination of intuitive 
cooperation among outgroup targets, in a 
loss frame, or when these features are 
combined, we conducted three power 
analyses using Fisher’s exact test in 
G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & 
Lang, 2009). For the purposes of simplicity 
we excluded our baseline control 
condition from this simulation, focusing 
just on the effect of time pressure vs. delay. 
Assuming that the true effect is 50% 
cooperation under time delay and 70% 
cooperation under time pressure, setting α 
= .05, and applying the actual sample sizes 
we obtained following participant 
exclusions, we conducted three analyses 
corresponding to those reported in the 
results section. First, for the effects of time 
pressure vs. time delay restricted to the 
outgroup conditions, we had power of .98. 
Second, for the the effects of time pressure 
vs. time delay restricted to the losses frame 
conditions, we had power of .97. Third, for 
the effects of time pressure vs. delay 
restricted to the outgroup and loss frame 




We used a fully between-subjects 
design where participants completed a 
Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD: Axelrod, 1980; 
Rapoport & Chammah, 1965) and we 
manipulated (1) whether participants were 
encouraged to make their decision 
intuitively, through deliberation, or in the 
absence of either instruction; (2) the group 
membership of the other player; and (3) 
whether the PD was framed in terms of 
gains or losses. This study had a fully 
between-subjects design with 12 
conditions: 2 (group membership of other 
player: in-group vs. out-group) x 2 (frame: 
gains vs. losses) x 3 (instructions: time 
delay vs. time pressure vs. unconstrained 
control). 
Upon beginning the study, participants 
were told that they would be randomly 
Forthcoming: Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 
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assigned to one of two teams (Eagles or 
Rattlers) based on their responses to five 
short personality questions, and that these 
teams were competing with other in a 
problem solving task (Cikara, Bruneau, 
Van Bavel & Saxe, 2014). Upon being 
assigned to a team (always the Eagles), 
participants were told that before 
completing the competitive problem-
solving task they would first engage in a 
short and entirely separate game (the PD) 
with another participant, where this other 
participant could either be from their team 
(in-group), or the other team (out-group). 
We employed novel teams to control for 
the effects of stereotypes and familiarity, 
but made them competitive to simulate the 
functional relations between groups in 
conflict (Chang, Krosch, & Cikara, 2016).  
Participants were then given 
comprehensive instructions and extensive 
training on the structure of the PD to 
ensure that they understood the different 
possible outcomes of the game (see 
materials on OSF). All participants were 
required to manually enter the different 
outcomes that each player would receive 
depending on the choices of the other 
player in an example matrix, and 
participants had to enter these correctly 
before being able to move forward in the 
study. Therefore, and in contrast to most 
previous studies, we did not have to 
exclude any participants based on failing to 
understand the structure of the game1.  
The PD was framed in one of two 
different ways (see Figure 1). In the first, 
standard, version of the game – the gains 
frame - participants learned that they 
could earn an additional bonus of up to 
$0.70 depending on the decisions that both 
they and the other player made in the 
game. For example, if both participants 
chose to cooperate, they would both gain 
$0.50 and so would end the game with a 
bonus of $0.50. In the the losses frame 
participants were told they had been given 
a bonus of $0.80 and that they would lose a 
certain amount (at least $0.10) based on the 
decision they made and the decision the 
other player made. For example, if both 
participants chose to cooperate, they 
would both lose $0.30 and would end the 
game with a bonus of $0.50. Therefore, in 
both versions of the game, participant’s 
choice to cooperate or defect would yield 
the same eventual bonus – but whether this 
was framed as gaining or losing money 
differed. 
To encourage participants to make 
their decision intuitively or through 
deliberation, we drew on previous 
research and had participants make their 
decision under time pressure or time delay 
(Cone & Rand, 2014; Rand, Brescoll, 
Everett, Capraro, & Barcelo, 2016; Rand et 
al., 2012). Reducing the amount of time 
participants have to make their decision 
decreases the potential for deliberation to 
outweigh intuition, thus leading to more 
intuitive decisions (Wright, 1974). In this 
study, we encouraged participants to rely 
on intuition by requiring them to make 
their decision in less than 15 seconds (time 
pressure), encouraged to think 
deliberatively by requiring them wait for at 
least 15 seconds before deciding (time 
delay), or did not specify how long to take 
before making a decision (control). This 
specific time to induce intuition vs. 
deliberation (15 seconds) was determined 
after running a pilot study (N = 102) in 
which, in the absence of any instructions to 
be fast or slow, participants took a median 
time of 17 seconds. As planned, participants 
in the intuition condition who did not 
make a decision within the allotted time 
were excluded from data analysis. 
Furthermore, in order to ensure that 
participants in the time pressure and time 
delay conditions did not systematically 
differ in terms of their ability to answer in 
a short time-frame, participants in the time 
delay condition completed a bonus round 
of the PD (with an alternative matrix in 
which all values were reduced by 0.05) 
under time pressure after completing the 
main task. Participants in the time delay 
condition who failed to make a decision in 
the allotted time in this bonus round were 
also excluded from data analysis. In the 
main task, participants in the time delay 
condition took a median time of 23 
seconds, and participants in the intuition 
condition took a median time of 9 seconds. 
Response times for the control condition 




In order to assess the effects of group 
membership, gains/losses frame, and time 
manipulation on the likelihood that 
participants made cooperative decisions in 
Forthcoming: Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 
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the PD we conducted a series of logistic 
regressions in R. We began by fitting the 
full summative model (including all 
predictors and their interactions) and then 
used likelihood ratio tests to compare its fit 
with various nested models. We started by 
dropping the interaction terms and found 
that none of these improved the model fit. 
However, dropping any of the main effects 
(group; gains/losses frame; time 
manipulation) did result in significantly 
worse fit, indicating that all three 
predictors were necessary for analysis. We 
therefore report the results of this best-
fitting model, which includes additive 
effects of each predictor, but no 
interactions and examine simple effects 
using least-square (adjusted) means with 
the Tukey method to correct for multiple 
comparisons. 
This model showed main effects of all 
three predictors (see Table 1 and Figure 2). 
There was a significant effect of decision 
frame (B = -.42, SE = .12, Z = -3.52, p < .001) 
such that participants were more likely to 
cooperate under a gains frame (61%) than a 
losses frame (51%), and a significant effect 
of group membership (B = -.30, SE = .12, Z 
= -2.51, p = .01) such that participants were 
more likely to cooperate with an in-group 
(60%) than an out-group member (53%). 
Finally, participants were more likely to 
cooperate under time pressure (63%) than 
under time delay (49%) (B = .58, SE = 0.15, 
Z = 3.81, p = .004), and marginally more 
likely to cooperate when given no 
instructions (57%) than under time delay 
(B = .31, SE = 0.15, Z = 2.44, p = .08). 
Although participants cooperated slightly 
more under time pressure than when given 
no instructions, this difference was not 
significant (B = -.27, SE = 0.15, Z = -1.79, p = 
.17).  
To confirm the robustness of our time 
pressure findings, we conducted three 
additional analyses. First, modeling the 
effect of time pressure vs. time delay only 
within the outgroup conditions, we found 
a significant effect of time pressure (Z = -
3.60, p < .001) such that participants were 
more likely to cooperate with outgroup 
members under time pressure (61%) than 
under time delay (43%). Second, modelling 
the effect of time pressure vs. time delay 
only within the losses frame conditions, we 
found a significant effect of time pressure 
(Z = -3.68, p < .001) such that participants 
were more likely to cooperate in loss 
frames under time pressure (60%) than 
under time delay (41%). Finally, we 
modelled the effect of time pressure vs. 
time delay only within the outgroup and 
losses frame conditions. Again, we found a 
significant effect of time pressure (Z = -
3.63, p < .001) such that participants were 
more likely to cooperate under time 
pressure (62%) than under time delay 
(35%), even towards outgroup members 
and even in a losses frame.  
Overall, then, our analysis of simple 
effects demonstrates that, compared to 
time delay, time pressure leads to greater 
cooperation even in specific conditions 
where we hypothesized it might break 
down. Specifically, time pressure increases 
cooperation even for outgroups with a 
difference of 18 percentage points; just 
when analyzing losses frames with a 
difference of 19 percentage points; and 
especially for outgroup members under a 
losses frame, with a difference of 27 




In this study we investigated intuitive 
cooperation, considering both 
methodological and theoretical challenges 
to this work. Our findings make three main 
contributions to the literature. First, our 
work addresses concerns about selection 
bias – the asymmetric exclusion of high 
numbers of participants across conditions 
- that have plagued work on intuitive 
cooperation (Bouwmeester et al., 2017; 
Tinghög et al., 2013). Specifically, we 
drastically reduced participant exclusions 
from around 50% to just 2%, equated 
exclusion rates across the two active 
manipulation conditions, and ensured that 
all participants understood the structure of 
the game. Even when addressing these 
methodological issues we observed greater 
cooperation in the time pressure condition 
relative to the time delay condition, 
supporting the claims of the SSH. At the 
same time, however, by including a neutral 
control condition, we found that intuitive 
cooperation effects seem driven more by 
time-delay induced deliberation reducing 
cooperation than by time-pressure 
induced intuition increasing cooperation.  
Second, our work sheds light on 
intuitive cooperation in intergroup 
Forthcoming: Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 
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contexts. Contrary to traditional 
assumptions about implicit intergroup 
cognition, according to which people 
harbour intuitive biases that are 
particularly revealed in the absence of 
deliberative control, increased time 
pressure did not detectably increase or 
decrease intergroup bias. In other words, 
that is, we did not detect a two-way 
interaction between time pressure and 
group status on cooperation. We did 
employ an arbitrary, competitive groups 
paradigm in the present study and so it 
remains possible that a more forceful 
manipulation drawn from real social 
groups would yield a different result (as 
seen in Rand et al., 2015).  Yet, note that our 
group manipulation was strong enough to 
yield a significant main effect of group 
membership: People cooperated more with 
members of their own group across all 
conditions. Critically, group membership 
also did not eliminate the effect of intuition 
versus deliberation on cooperation.  Just as 
intuition enhances cooperation with 
ingroup members, we find that it also 
enhances cooperation with outgroup 
memebers.  In sum, then, intuition 
increases prosociality but also fails to 
eradicate bias: Under time pressure 
participants cooperate with everybody 
more, but regardless of time pressure they 
cooperate with ingroups most of all. While 
we may be intuitive cooperators, we are 
not intuitively impartial. 
Third, by investigating the boundary 
condition of losses framing on the effects of 
time pressure, ours is among the first 
studies to look at intuitive cooperation in 
both gains and losses frames. We extended 
previous work by showing that time 
pressure encourages cooperation even in 
losses frames, and even towards outgroup 
members in losses frames, and that there 
was greater overall cooperation in the 
gains context relative to the losses. This is 
consistent with work supporting a self-
oriented perspective on loss aversion, 
whereby an aversion to losses makes 
people demand more in interpersonal 
interactions (De Dreu, Emans, Vliert, & 
Carnevale, 1994; De Dreu, Emans, & Van de 
Vliert, 1992), increases cheating (Schindler 
& Pfattheicher, 2017),  and reduces 
prosocial behaviour (Brewer & Kramer, 
1986). On the other hand, this is perplexing 
because it contrasts with more recent work 
taking an other-oriented perspective on 
loss aversion (e.g. Everett, Faber, & 
Crockett, 2015; Leliveld, Beest, Dijk, & 
Tenbrunsel, 2009) in which a loss frame 
encourages greater prosocial behaviour. 
This may reflect the cognitive complexity 
of our loss-framed PD, where participants 
had to remember that they had a starting 
payment of $0.80 and then mentally 
subtract the values in the matrix from that. 
If this complexity prompted greater 
deliberation, this could result in reduced 
cooperation simply because deliberative 
thinking promotes defection in the PD. 
This remains an interesting direction for 
further study. 
At least two limitations of this work 
bear mention. First, we used deception in 
this task – both in the group manipulation 
and by not paying participants according to 
their decisions. This is one feature that 
differentiates our work from previous 
studies (e.g. Bouwmeester et al., 2017) and 
it would be preferable in future work for a 
full non-deception procedure to be 
implemented. Second, while we had 
sufficient power to moderately sized main 
effects, and also to detect the potential 
elimination of the “intuitive cooperation” 
effect in the critical cells of our design, we 
had weak statistical power to detect 
moderate two-interactions among 
variables, and insufficient statistical power 
to reliably detect moderate three-way 
interactions.  Thus, our research provides 
strong evidence that intuitive cooperation 
effects exist even towards outgroup 
members, in a loss frame, and under the 
combination of these factors.  It does not, 
however, provide strong evidence 
regarding whether the effects that exist are 
weaker or stronger that in the standard 
ingroup/gain frame condition.  It would be 
interesting for future work to use a larger 
sample to explore such interaction effects .  
In conclusion, we studied the effects of 
intuition versus deliberation on 
cooperation in an intergroup context, 
developing a new procedure that addresses 
methodological concerns that have 
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Table 1. Rates of cooperation across conditions. 
 
Gains Frame 














Intuition 90 62 69% 99 60 61% 
Reflection 96 60 62% 96 48 50% 
Control 117 79 68% 102 57 56% 
 
Losses Frame 














Intuition 84 49 58% 93 58 62% 
Reflection 88 41 47% 86 30 35% 













Figure 1.  Example Matrices given to participants (left: gains frame with in-group partner; 
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1 While 1687 participants opened the study link, only 1626 moved beyond the first page of 
the personality questions for the team assignment (dropout of 4%) and only 1316 moved 
beyond the instructions of the game and comprehension checks (dropout of 18%). This led 
to a total dropout rate of 22%, but one that was broadly equivalent across conditions. As can 
be seen in Table 1, there were roughly the same number of people in both the in-group (N = 
573) and out-group (N = 567) conditions, and both the time delay (N = 366) and time 
pressure (N = 366) conditions. There were slightly more participants in the control condition 
(N = 407) compared to the time delay and time pressure, and slightly more participants in 
the gains conditions (N = 600) than the losses conditions (N = 540), but these differences 
were small.  
 
 
                                                
